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Abstract
In this paper, we model networks of relational contracts. We explore sanctioning
power within these networks under diﬀerent information technologies depending on the
shape of the network. The value of the relational network lies in the enforcement of
cooperative agreements which would not be enforceable for the agents without access
to the punishment power of other network members. We identify conditions for sta-
bility of such networks, conditions for transmission of information about past actions,
and conditions under which self-sustainable subnetworks may actually inhibit a stable
network.
JEL Codes: L13, L29, D23, D43, O17
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1 Introduction
Increasing evidence shows that relational arrangements are an important governance mecha-
nism over interactions of economic agents. This is not only the case in developing economies
but also in well developed economic environments, most prominently in the fast changing
one of high-tech industries. Especially in R&D-intensive industries, many ﬁrms enter col-
laborations in order to trade-oﬀ risk and return from their high-risk activities. But formal
arrangements often merely represent the tip of the iceberg, ”beneath which lies a sea of
informal relations” (Powell et al. 1996). On the one hand, lacking contractibility over the
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1main ingredients — investments into human capital and knowledge transfers — excludes mar-
ket relations, the need for ﬂexibility on the other hand excludes vertical integration. Annalee
Saxenian (1994) reports a highly specialized, network-like vertical organization within the
computer-industry in Silicon Valley within which informal relations play a crucial role for the
success of the district in comparison with Route 128, a competing district close to Boston:
”While they competed ﬁercely, Silicon Valley’s producers were embedded in, and inseparable
from, these social and technical networks.” It is noteworthy that the informal relations re-
ported by Saxenian are not only of value on their own, they are of special value due to their
being part of a network of such relations between engineers. Examining the biotechnology
industry, Powell et al. (1996) point out, that the ”development of cooperative routines goes
beyond simply learning how to maintain a large number of ties. Firms must learn how to
transfer knowledge across alliances and locate themselves in those network positions that
enable them to keep pace with the most promising scientiﬁc or technological developments.”
The networks themselves form when individuals establish relations. Using their position
within the network, and therefore using the network itself for their interests, thus becomes a
central issue for those ﬁrms. This paper is an attempt to model these networks of relational
contracts.
In recent economic research, both, the emergence and stability of networks and relational
governance mechanisms, have aroused the interest of many theoretical as well as experimen-
tal scholars. Being well connected, at the best with themselves well connected partners, is
valuable. When agents set up costly links, thereby forming a network, a conﬂict between
eﬃcient and stable networks may arise. This line of research has been surveyed in an ex-
cellent article by Matthew Jackson (2003). Most prominent contributions to this literature
are Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), who model the emergence and stability of a social infor-
mation and communication network when agents choose to set up and maintain or destroy
costly links, using the notion of pairwise stability, Bala and Goyal (2000a) who consider
the setup of a link by one agent only, Johnson and Gilles (2000), who introduce a spatial
cost structure leading to equilibria of locally complete networks, or Bala and Goyal (2000b),
who explored communication reliability. The strategic aspect in these models lies in the
question of whether to build and maintain a link or not. The commonly asked question in
these models is: Given a value of a network, a sharing rule and the cost of maintaining a
link, which networks will emerge in equilibrium and are they eﬃcient. The underlying game
and enforceability problems are thereby the left out of consideration. We depart from that
literature in two ways: First, we explicitly model an underlying game, which allows us to
2study consequences of its features for stability of ﬁxed network structures.S e c o n d , w e do
not examine network formation. We examine enforceability problems within ﬁxed network
structures with a speciﬁc game underlying the links and thereby the stability thereof.
To our best knowledge, work that explicitly models the underlying game in the past has
largely focused on random matching games. Kandori (1992) and Groh (2002) consider such a
random matching repeated prisoners’ dilemma situation. Both show how much cooperation
is possible, Kandori without information processing and Groh with reliable and unreliable
communication in a network. Groh introduces the endogenous decision of players to pass on
information. In contrast to Kandori and Groh, we do not consider games between changing
partners, but ﬁxed neighbors. This introduces a forward induction element into strategic
behavior when defecting. We keep Groh’s endogenous decision of players to pass on informa-
tion on past games’ actions. We introduce the possibility to pass on informations received
by partners in the underlying game.
The closest theoretical literature to ours is not from the network formation literature.
Our work relates the closest to the literature of multimarket contact ` al aB e r n h e i ma n d
Whinston (1990) and Maggi (1999). In Bernheim and Whinston’s paper, collusion between
two agents is fostered by tying the actions from one relation to the ones in the other relation.
Asymmetries of payoﬀs drive the result. Maggi models international trade cooperation with
multilateral punishment mechanisms. We depart from and extend the work of Bernheim and
Whinston by allowing our agents to exploit indirect multimarket contact. They maintain
relations by using the network that not only consists of their own but also of other agents’
relations and thereby pool asymmetries in payoﬀs. We extend Maggis work by introducing
diﬀerent information transmission mechanisms that play a role in other applications than
international trade cooperation.
In this paper, we model networks of relational contracts as described by Saxenian or
Powell et al. We describe equilibrium conditions for diﬀerent simple architectures of such
n e t w o r k s ,p a y i n gs p e c i a la t t e n t i o nt od i ﬀerences in these conditions for circular and non-
circular architectures, and diﬀerent informational regimes. The basic framework is that of
repeated games between ﬁxed partners ` al aM a g g i( 1999). We consider three information
transmission structures. We study ﬁrst perfect information transmission, that is each agent
observes the histories of the games for all agents. We consider secondly the case where no
information can be transmitted at all. Here each player only observes the histories of his own
games with his direct partners. And thirdly we consider the case where, while agents meet
to transact, they exchange information on the game. In this environment, in addition to
3observing his own history, in each period each agent transmits or receives a veriﬁed message
to/from each of his partners about the histories of their games and about messages they
received. We assume that it takes one period or a smaller number of periods for such an
information to travel from one agent to the other, therefore with a delay, an agent may be
informed about all other players’ actions to whom he is connected in the network. However,
we always require agents to be willing to pass on information, that is shouting — informing
one’s neighbor’s neighbors is not allowed for, and we explicitely assume that exchange of
information only takes place while meeting for the transactions underlying the relations.
We begin with sustainable network where agents can only have relations with two neigh-
bors. We show that if agents cannot discipline themselves within a certain relation, a circular
p o o l i n go fa s y m m e t r i cp a y o ﬀs may sustain the relation. In contrast to Groh, the possibility
to transmit information about the cheating of someone through the links in the network
will not be an equilibrium action if enforcement relies on unrelenting punishment. Once
an agent deviates, a contagious process eliminates cooperation in the network. With more
complex punishment strategies agents may use information transmission and thereby keep
on cooperating in the rest of the network while punishing the deviator. We show that, under
the complete information assumption, bilaterally unsustainable relations in a network with-
out ”redundant” links, may can be sustained by having self-sustaining relations at the ends
of the network while this does not work for the other informational assumptions. Thirdly
we show that having self-sustaining relations in the network may actually hurt cooperation
in the case without full information because agents might not be willing to perform the
punishment if this is unrelenting. In this case a network may be sustainable if we use relent-
ing punishments. As opposed to standard results in the literature, in our model, improved
outside options, possibly by more eﬃcient spot markets, for one player may under certain
conditions actually foster cooperation by making the breakup of a relation in the case of
a deviation a credible threat. The results are ﬁnally generalized to more complex network
a r c h i t e c t u r e sw h e r ep l a y e r sm a yh a v em o r et h a nt w on e i g h b o r s .
The paper starts with the deﬁnition of a network of relations in section 2. In section 3,
we derive results for sustainable networks with the restriction of at most two neighbors when
the punishment mechanism does not provide for a re-closure of the network in a punishment
period. Section 4 provides an analysis of punishment mechanisms that do allow for re-closure
of the network in punishment periods. We extend the results from section 3 to situations
with more neighbors in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
42 The model
2.1 Interaction
There is a set of inﬁnitely lived agents N = {1,...,n}, with i ∈ N. In each period t,e a c h
agent i chooses an action with respect to every other agent j ∈ N from the set of actions
A
ij





t .A na c t i o n p r o ﬁle is then at ≡ ×i∈N ×j∈N\i a
ij
t .P e rp e r i o dp a y o ﬀsa r ea
real valued function Ui
t : At 7→ <,i∈ N. For each pair agents (i,j)w ea s s u m et h es t a g e
game to be a prisoners’ dilemma with the following payoﬀmatrix:
agent j
Cji Dji
agent i Cij ci,j,c j,i li,j,w j,i
Dij wi,j,l j,i di,j,d j,i
with li,j <d i,j <c i,j <w i,j and li,j +wi,j < 2ci,j, ∀i,j ∈ N, i 6= j. Note that the stage game
is constant over time. Note also that the assumptions on the payoﬀs imply the static Nash
equilibrium characterized by (Dij,Dji).
Agents are assumed to interact repeatedly. Time is discrete, and all agents are assumed
to share a discount factor δ, meant to capture the time preferences. For simplicity, we assume


























For this stage game, we have learned from the folk theorem that for agents patient enough
(that is for a high enough δ), by repeatedly interacting in this game ad inﬁnitum, it is
possible to sustain the action proﬁle (Cij,Cji) as a Nash equlibrium (see e.g. Friedman,
1971).
2.2 Relations and networks
In this section, we deﬁne what mean by a relation and by a network of relations and give some
deﬁnitions useful for analysing these networks. We start by deﬁning a relation according to
the usual deﬁnition in the literature.
5Deﬁnition 1 (Relation) Agents i and j are connected by a relation if and only if they re-
peatedly choose to play Cij,Cji in the stage game.
For notational convenience let us deﬁne the diﬀerence between the payoﬀ of player i of





i,j − (1 − δ)w
i,j.
A standard interpretation of gij is the net gains for i from cooperating with j considering
grim trigger strategies according to Friedman (1971). Therefore, if gij > 0, i does not have
an incentive to deviate in an inﬁnitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma with trigger strategies.
However, a gij < 0d o e snot mean that there is no gain for agent i from cooperation with
agent j. It just means that agent i would like to deviate and bilateral cooperation is,
therefore, unfeasible. We call a relation of player i with player j deﬁcient for player i if
gij < 0 and non-deﬁcient for player i if gij ≥ 0.
Deﬁnition 2 (mutual, unilateral, bilaterally deﬁcient relation) The relation ij is called mu-
tual iﬀ gij ≥ 0 and gji ≥ 0, it is called unilateral iﬀ either gij < 0 and gji ≥ 0 or gij ≥ 0
and gji < 0, it is called bilaterally deﬁcient iﬀ gij < 0 and gji < 0.
We are now in the state to deﬁne a network. We interpret a collection of the agents and
their relations as a network.
Deﬁnition 3 (Network) An e t w o r kN S =( N,R) is a graph1 consisting of a ﬁnite nonempty
subset N of the set of agents N together with a set R of two element ordered subsets of N,
where (i,j) ∈ R iﬀ i and j are connected by a relation.
For simplicity, we assume N = N.2
Deﬁnition 4 (Sustainability) A relational network N S =( N,R) is sustainable iﬀ all rela-
tions between the agents in N are simultaneously supportable in sequential equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 5 (Stability) A sustainable relational network N S =( N,R) is strategically sta-
ble if it fulﬁlls Kohlberg and Mertens’ stability criteria.
1A directed graph G =( V,E)i saﬁnite nonempty set V of elements called vertices,t o g e t h e rw i t ha
set E of two element ordered subsets of V called edges or arcs.
2We can just as well deﬁne the Network as N S =( N,R).
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of a network of relations
A way to represent such a network is of course graphical, where a line is drawn from
agent j to agent i if (i,j) ∈ R. In our graphical representation, we depart from our original
undirected network deﬁnition by adding information on deﬁciency of relations. We depict a
non-deﬁcient relation for player i by an incoming arc to player i. A unilateral relation, thus,
is depicted by an arc originating from the agent for whom the relation in deﬁcient. A mutual
relation is depicted by an incoming arc to both players. A bilaterally deﬁcient relation is just
a line. Refer to ﬁgure 1:A g e n t s1 and 2 share a mutual relation and the relation between 2
and 3 is unilateral, it is deﬁcient for player 2 and non-deﬁcient for player 3.
Deﬁnition 6 (mutual, non-mutual, mixed network) A relational network is called a mutual
network if it only consists of mutual relations. A network is called a non-mutual network if
it does not contain mutual relations. A network is called a mixed network if it consists of
both, mutual and other relations.
Agent i is called adjacent from agent j and agent j adjacent to agent i if (i,j) ∈ R and
gij ≥ 0. Two agents are called directly connected in the social network (or adjacent) if
(i,j) ∈ R. The set of agents adjacent to or from i are the neighborhood of i, denoted
by Ni, and j ∈ Ni ⇔ i ∈ Nj.
Given N S =( N,R), the number of agents in N is called the order of N S and the
number of relations in R the size of N S. The number of arcs directed away from agent i
is called the outdegree of agent i and denoted by odi, and the number of arcs directed
into agent i is called the indegree of agent i, denoted by idi. The degree of vertex i is the
number of arcs directed away or into agent i,d e n o t e dd e gi =o di+idi. An agent of degree
1 is called end vertex. In ﬁgure 1, 1 is an end vertex, deg2 = 3, id2 = 2, od2 = 1.
Let i and j be two agents of N S.Ai − j walk in N S is a ﬁnite alternating sequence of
agents and links that begins with agent i and ends with agent j a n di nw h i c he a c hl i n ki n
the sequence joins the agent that precedes it in the sequence to the agent that follows in the
sequence. The number of links in an i − j walk is length l(i,j)o ft h ei − j walk. A path
7connecting i1 and ik is an i1−ik walk in which no agent is repeated. An i−j walk is closed
if i = j and open otherwise. A closed path is a cycle.An e t w o r ko fo r d e rc that consists
only of a cycle is called the c-cycle. If a network contains no cycles, it is called acyclic. The
network N S is called circular if there exists a path {i1,i 2,...,ik} with k = 1.
2.3 Information structures
We will consider the following mechanisms for the transmission of information between










(I1) Complete Information: At time τ, each agent i ∈ N S observes
• (amn
t )t=1,...,τ ∈ Hmn ∀m,n ∈ N S.
Each agent observes the histories of the games for all agents.









t=1,...,τ ∈ Hij ∀j ∈ Ni.
Each agent only observes the histories of his own games with his direct opponents.













v] ∈ Hmn,m∈ Nn, where min[l(i,m),l(i,n)] = l if there
exists an i − m path.
In information structure (I3), in addition to observing his own history, in each period
each agent i transmits or receives veriﬁable messages to/from each agent j ∈ Ni about the
histories of their relations or about messages they received. A message on past behavior can,
thus, travel over v links per period. However, since agents only meet when they cooperate,
information can only be transmitted in that case.
For an illustration of the three informational assumptions, suppose a non-circular con-
nected network with 7 agents, call them agent 1 through 7, as in ﬁgure 2. Suppose ﬁrst (I1).
Each agent immediately knows everything that happened between every other two players,
that is for example between agents 6 and 7 or between agents 2 and 3. Next suppose (I2).
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T=1,...,τ T=1,...,τ-1 T=1,...,τ-2 T=1,...,τ-3
Figure 2: Agent 1’s ”observations”
Here each agent only knows the history of his own play, that is agent 1 only knows what
happend between agents 1 and 2.
At last, suppose (I3) and suppose v =2 .T h e ni nt = τ,a g e n t1 observes the full history
of his own play starting at t = 1 through t = τ. Furthermore, he will receive messages


























t=1,...,τ−2,a n ds oo n .
There are many situations, in which it seems natural to assume that there does not
exist an institution that gathers and disseminates truthfully any information concerning
the behavior of network members. In (I3), we thus suppose instead that information can
only be transmitted through personal contact of members of the network and that each
transmission takes time, e.g. one period. Information transmission is being delayed and
therefore punishment will set in at a later point in time. Therefore, a higher discount
factor δ, that is more patience of agents, will be necessary to sustain the network. An
essential feature of this information structure is that agents have to have an incentive to
actually transmit information to their neighbor. Thus, even with high speeds of information
transmission, if agents do not want to transmit information but rather deviate and reap
deviation proﬁts, this potential higher speed of information transmission will not show an
eﬀect as to the networks sustainable.
We assume that in networks of relations communicating besides interacting is not costly.
This, we think, is a reasonable assumption since very often chatting next to everyday business
— if anything — gives pleasure to agents.
3 Sustainable networks
Most insights can be gained by examining networks with restricted number of neighbors and
identical payoﬀs across individuals. Therefore, we focus on networks with nodes of a maximal
degree of two, that is each agent can have at most two neighbors. We will later discuss how
9the results generalize in larger networks. Throughout this section, we suppose agents are
not able to close the network by creating new links. We, therefore focus on mechansisms
that do not involve a re-closure of the network in a punishment period. A justiﬁcation for
such a restriction may be that there is a geography underlying the network, i.e. that not all
members of the network can have a relation with each other. Often there are very speciﬁc
transactions underlying the relations and it is not possible to substitute one relation with
another one. A second reason for such a focus may be that networks using re-closure are
either not sustainable (they are not an equilibrium) or not strategically stable (they are
unlikely to be chosen as an equilibrium). A relaxation of this assumption will be discussed
in section 4.
3.1 Unilateral networks
In the theory of repeated games it is stated that in two-player repeated prisoners’ dilemmas,
in order to sustain a cooperative outcome as a Nash equilibrium, it is necessary that the gain
from deviating net of the loss from punishment must be outweighed by the gain agents incur
from cooperating for ever. Translated into the language we used above, bilateral relations are
sustainable, if and only if they are mutual or in other words unilateral relations would not
be sustainable. Agents would not cooperate with each other since the most severe bilateral
punishment available is not strong enough and there are no other agents to discipline them.
However, once agents are aware of the network structure of their potential relations and
form a punishment coalition, where deviations from agreed on behavior will be punished
multilaterally, it may well be possible to pool these asymmetric payoﬀsi naw a yt h a ta l s o
networks containing unilateral or even bilaterally deﬁcient relations become sustainable. In
this section, we explore how this pooling has to take place. We start with a negative result
in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 There does not exist a sustainable non-mutual non-circular network, independent
of the discount factor and the information structure.
Proof. A network has been deﬁned non-circular if for no agent i1 ∈ N S there exists a
path {i1,i 2,...,ik} with i1 = ik. It has been deﬁned non-mutual if gij > 0 ⇔ gji ≤ 0. In such
a network, there would have to be either an agent e at the end vertex with ode = 1 or an
agent m in the middle with odm =2 . Since we assumed degi ≤ 2 ,t h e r ew i l ln o tb ea n y
punishment from other neighbors and agent e0s or agent m0s dominant strategy is to defect
from the relation.Q.E.D.
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(b)
Figure 3: Only the empty network (b) is sustainable
m2 e1 m3 m1 m4 e2
Figure 4: Circular unilateral network
Lemma 1 says that as long as relations are not mutual, they are not sustainable by a
multilateral mechanism within a non-circular network. Figure 3 illustrates this: Part (a)
shows a network that is not sustainable. In that situation, agent e1 always has an incentive
to deviate and the only sustainable network is empty, as shown in (b).
Leaving non-circular networks, imagine agents e1 and e2 share a unilateral relation that
is non-deﬁcient for e1, thus consider a circular network as in ﬁgure 4. In this case, each agent
in the network has an incoming and an outgoing arc which suggests that we may exploit
payoﬀ asymmetries with a multilateral mechanism. The network will be sustainable if the
punishment coalition agrees on strategies that — given the information structure — makes
the losses from a deviation big enough for the agents to prefer to cooperate. Under (I1)
for example, such strategies may require every agent to play the cooperative action in every
period and in the case of a deviation that the deviator gets punished by both his neighbors.
Let us formally deﬁne some strategy proﬁles for non-mutual relational networks under
the three information structures. Strategies (S1) will serve for the full information case (I1),
while (S2) serves for (I2) and for (I3).
Strategy proﬁle (S1)
1. Each agent i ∈ N S starts by playing the agreed upon action vector Cij ∀i ∈ N S,∀j ∈
Ni.
112. Each player i goes on playing Cij ∀j ∈ Ni as long as no deviation by any player in the
network is observed.
3. Every agent i reverts to Dij ∀j ∈ Ni f o re v e ri fad e v i a t i o nb ya n yp l a y e ri nt h en e t w o r k
occurred.
Strategy and belief proﬁle (S2)
1. Each agent i ∈ N S starts by playing the agreed upon action vector Cij ∀i ∈ N S,∀j ∈
Ni .
2. If player i observes every of his neighbors j ∈ Ni play Cji she goes on playing Cij
∀j ∈ Nj.
3. If player i observes a neighbor j play Dji in t = τ she reverts to Dij ∀j ∈ Ni ∀t ≥ τ +1,
that is in all his future interactions with all neighbors.
For agents j with id(j)=1, beliefs are such that
(i) if they observe cooperation on both sides, they believe that all agents in the network
cooperated so far,
(ii) if they observe a deviation on both sides, they believe that the neighbor with whom
they share their deﬁcient relation was the ﬁrst to deviate, and
(iii) if they observe a deviation only from the agent with whom they share their non-deﬁcient
relation, they give an equal probability to the event that any of the other players was
the ﬁrst to deviate.
For agents3 j with id(j) = 2, beliefs are such that
(iv) if they observe cooperation on both sides, they believe that all agents in the network
cooperated so far,
(v) if they observe a deviation on both sides, they believe whatever.
(vi) if they observe a deviation on only one side, they give an equal probability to the event
that any of the other players was the ﬁrst to deviate.
3We will need this part of the belief structure only when we consider mixed networks. In unilateral




Figure 5: Circular unilateral network
Proposition 1 Suppose the network is a c-cycle. Then
1. Under information structure (I1), a non-mutual relational network is sustainable if
and only if ∀i ∈ N S gi,i−1 + gi,i+1 > 0;
2. Under information structures (I2) , a non-mutual relational network is sustainable if
and only if ∀i ∈ N S δ
c−2gi,i−1 + gi,i+1 > 0, where, w.o.l.o.g., gi,i+1 < 0.
3. Under information structure (I3), a strategy proﬁle using unforgiving punishment con-
stitutes a sustainable non-mutual relational network if and only if ∀i ∈ N S δ
c−2gi,i−1+
gi,i+1 > 0, where, w.o.l.o.g., gi,i+1 < 0, regardless of the speed of information transmis-
sion.
For the proof of proposition 1, refer to ﬁgure 5. It visualizes a non-mutual circular
network. Note that in a non-mutual network, if a deviation is ever proﬁtable, it is optimal
for an agent i to immediately deviate from a relation that is deﬁcient and to deviate from a
relation that is non-deﬁcient in the period before a punishment from that respective neighbor
is expected. This follows directly from deﬁnition 2.
Proof. Part 1 of proposition 1: Suﬃciency: Consider strategies (S1)S i n c ead e v i a t o r
faces immediate Nash-reversion from both his neighbors, no matter whether she deviates
towards one partner or both, she can just as well deviate from both her relations. Therefore,
the network is a Nash-Equilibrium in a circular network if ∀ig i,i−1+gi,i+1 > 0. It is subgame
perfect since in the punishment phase, the stage Nash equilibrium is played.
Necessity: Since during the punishment phase the agents play their minimax strategy
and the punishment phase is inﬁnitely long, this is the strongest punishment available to the
agents. If cooperation is not possible with these strategies, it will not be possible with other
13— less strong — punishments. Therefore gi,i−1 + gi,i+1 > 0 ∀i ∈ N S is also necessary for the
relational network to be supportable.
Part 2 of proposition 1: Suﬃciency: Consider strategies (S2). An agent might want to
deviate only towards one neighbor in the ﬁrst period and continue cooperating with the other
neighbor until the period in which this other neighbor is being communicated the deviation
of i in his interaction with the ﬁrst neighbor. If at all, the agent would sensibly ﬁrst deviate
from his deﬁcient relation, that is from his relation with i+1, and — as late as possible, since
deviating from a bilaterally non-deﬁcient relation is a cost — from his other relation. This




i,i+1 ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N
S and {i − 1,i+ 1} = Ni.
Since every agent i in the network would want to deviate bilaterally from his relation with
i + 1, was it not for the threat of the loss of cooperation in her other relation, after losing
this other relation for ever, infecting is rational and the equilibrium is subgame perfect. This
is true for any belief about the history of the game.
Necessity: Since during the punishment phase the agents play their minimax strategy
and the punishment phase is inﬁnitely long, this is the strongest punishment available to the
agents. If cooperation is not possible with these strategies, it will not be possible with other
— less strong — punishments. Therefore δ
c−2gi,i−1 + gi,i+1 > 0 ∀i ∈ N S is also necessary for
the relational network to be supportable.
Part 3 of proposition 1: Assume information structure (I3) and non-forgiving strategies.
Suppose agent i observes a deviation of his neighbor i − 1 in his (i − 1’s) deﬁcient relation.
Then, since, due to the unforgiving strategies, there will never be a return to cooperation
with i−1, the best response of i in his (i’s) remaining deﬁcient relation would be to deviate
from that relation. Therefore agent i will not make use of her ability to transmit information,
leaving only room for the same strategies as under (I2).Q.E.D.
As we will see in section 4, the only if part of part 3 of proposition 1 may depend on the
agents’ ability or rather inability to re-close the network.
In the next paragraph we will see that if one does not assume a non-mutual but a
mixed network instead, agents that share a mutual relation may be reluctant to exercise
punishments if strategies are unforgiving. This means, we will see that the equilibrium
described is inrobust with respect to the inclusion of mutual relations into the network.
143.2 Mixed networks
A network that consists only of mutual relations is sustainable (by deﬁnition). Thus, re-
placing a unilateral relation in a network with a mutual one, one might think, should, if
it changes something all, not reduce the set of sustainable networks. After all, we replace
someone who has an incentive to deviate from on of her relations with someone who does
not. However, this reasoning only refers to the cooperation phase of the strategies. Once
one examines incentives in the punishment phase, it will be required that an agent has an
incentive to deviate from cooperative behavior. Since a mutual is sustainable on a stand-
alone basis and the strategies described above involve the loss of cooperation if some agent
in the network deviates, segunda facie it does not seem to be that clear anymore, that the
agents have an incentive to exercise the agreed multilateral punishment. In examining the
eﬀects of a replacement on a unilateral relation with a mutual one, we will again ﬁrst study
non-circular networks. We will see that there is a week cooperation-enhancing eﬀect. We
will then turn to circular networks.
3.2.1 Non-circular networks with unforgiving punishments
In the previous section, we have seen that there does not exist a non-circular non-mutual
network. This was the case because there would be an agent at the end vertex of the non-
circular network who would have a deﬁcient relation and since he only faces punishment
from one side, he has an incentive to deviate from that relation. Once one takes an agent
as an end vertex who has a mutual relation, as in ﬁgure 6 (a), this incentive to deviate in
the cooperation phase should vanish. Under full information, then, agent e1 would know
everything agent m1 does in her interactions and so a multilateral punishment like (S1)
could be agreed on. Part 1 of proposition 2 states that. Part 2, on the other hand, retains
the result of lemma 1. Part 3 of that proposition argues that the equilibrium of Part 1 does
not satisfy reasonable stability criteria put forward by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). In
particular, if their Iterated Dominance criterion is applied, there exists a proﬁtable deviation
from a strategy like (S1) for the agent adjacent to the end vertex.
Proposition 2 Suppose degi ≤ 2.T h e n
1. under information structure (I1), a non-circular network N S is sustainable if
(a) idi|degi=1 = 1 and
(b) for all other agents in the network gi,i−1 + gi,i+1 > 0 holds, and
152. under information structures (I2) and (I3), there exists no sustainable non-circular
mixed network.
3. If the network under (I1) relies on unforgiving punishments, it is not strategically
stable.
Proof. Part 1 of proposition 2: Consider again (S1). A s s u m p t i o n( b )r u l e so u tt h e
possibility that an agent has odi>1. Therefore, all agents with degi = 2 face immediate
punishment after deviating from both sides and have no incentive to deviate if gi,i−1+gi,i+1 >
0. The only agents that might have an incentive to deviate then are the ones with degi = 1,
the end vertices of the network, which have no incentive to deviate if their indegree is 1.
Part 2 of proposition 2: Under (I2)o r( I3), enforcement relies on contagion or trans-
mission of information about past actions through the agents. In a non-mutual subnetwork
of a non-circular network, no agent i would get punished by another agent j than the one
from whose relation she is deviating. Agent j will not be infected or be informed about
the deviation by anyone, respectively. This is because i is the only one who could infect or
inform j, respectively. Therefore it is a dominant strategy of any agent i ∈ N S to defect to
any neighbor k ∈ Ni if gik ≤ 0.
Part 3 of proposition 2: Unforgiving punishment in our framework means to play accord-
ing to (S1), i.e. to play D on both sides forever if a deviation occured in the network.
As argued above, ruling out the play of strictly dominated strategies gives rise to a
proﬁtable deviation for each agent i of the mutual subnetwork who is also part of a non-
mutual subnetwork. Let agent m1 in ﬁgure 6 (a) defect only from her relation with m2.
Then sticking to the multilateral punishment mechanism (S1), is part of a strictly dominated
strategy for m1. It is strictly dominated by the strategy ”defect from both relations and then
stick to the multilateral punishment mechanism”. Thus, if agent e1 observes m1 deviate only
from her relation with m2, he knows that he does not want to stick to the punishment. Given
that m1 played Cm1,e1, there exists a focal equilibrium. This focal equilibrium is to switch
to a bilateral punishment mechanism, the normal grim trigger strategy. Since going on to
cooperate is in e1’s own interest, he should go on playing grim trigger. The resulting — stable
— equilibrium is the same as the one under (I2) and (I3), scetched in ﬁgure 6 (b). This gives
rise to a proﬁtable deviation for agent m1.Q.E.D.
Figure 6 illustrates proposition 2. If agent e2 has the possibility to tell m3 about m4
having deviated and deviating to both e2 and m3 is not proﬁtable for m4,t h i sn e t w o r ki s
supportable. This is the case under (I1), thus part 1 of proposition 2 says given (I1), ﬁgure
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Figure 6: Sustainable networks under (a) info structure (I1), (b) info structure (I2) and (I3)
6 (a) is an equilibrium. It is not the case under (I2)a n d( I3), thus part 2 of proposition 2
says given (I2)o r( I3), ﬁgure 6 (a) is not an equilibrium. The equilibrium network in that
case would be ﬁgure 6 (b).
However, there is a caveat. The resulting network under (I1) is not strategically stable.
The mutual interest in cooperation, which made cooperation of all agents in the non-circular
network an equilibrium, puts it on weak feet as it makes it unlikely to be selected as the
equilibrium played.
3.2.2 Circular networks with unforgiving punishments
We now turn to circular networks. We will start with a sustainable non-mutual network
and replace one of the unilateral relations by a mutual one. We will see that the agent who
net-gains from both sides thereby is being given an incentive to deviate from the punishment
if punishment involves playing the stage Nash-equilibrium with both neighbors forever. We
will also see that rewarding punishments may heal this.
Under full information, all members of the network observe a deviation and can therefore
enter a punishment phase immediately. Since punishment involves playing the static Nash
equilibrium forever, in expectation of the punishment, a deviator will play play according to
the punishment no matter whether the relation is a mutual or non-mutual one. This leads
to proposition 3, part 1.
Under the other two information regimes however, it is not possible to identify the initial
deviator. The contagious equilibrium, given by strategies (S2), in the case of a non-mutual
circular network, thus relied on the fact that, each agent that has been cheated on by a
neighbor, had an incentive to carry out the punishment on the deﬁcient side. If we introduce
a mutual subnetwork, there exist agents who do not have a deﬁcient relation. These agents
may be reluctant to enter into an punishment phase immediately if they observe a deviation
on only one side. This leads to proposition 3, part 2.
17Proposition 3 In a non-mutual circular network of size c with gi,i+1 ≤ 0 and gi,i−1 ≥ 0





. Replace the unilateral relation between i and
i + 1 with a mutual one.
1. Then, under information structure (I1),
(a) the resulting unidirected network is still sustainable
(b) but not strategically stable.
2. Denote with δ the minimum discount factor necessary to sustain the resulting network
under (I2) and (I3) with strategy and belief proﬁles (S2).T h e n
(a) for suﬃciently low li,i+1 or suﬃciently high wi,i+1, δ = δ.
(b) for insuﬃciently low li,i+1 and insuﬃciently high wi,i+1, (S2) does not result in a
sustainable network.
(c) if we require strategic stability, a low wi,i+1 is suﬃcient for the breakdown of the
network.
Proof. Part 1 (a): The optimality of the actions during a punishment phase proposed
in part 1 of the proof of proposition 1 only depended on the fact that the strategies played
by the deviator and his neighbors were in fact a stage Nash equilibrium. Since we have full
information, everybody knows everybody elses history and expecting the other to stick to
the prescribed strategy (S1) ,w o u l dl e a dt op l a y i n gDij whenever a deviation is observed.
Part 1 (b): The proof parallels the one for proposition 2 part 3.
Part 2 (a) through (c) we relegate to the appendix. Q.E.D.
The intuition for parts 2 (a) and (b) is the following (refer to ﬁgure 7): With beliefs
speciﬁed in the appendix, if agent i in ﬁgure 7 observes Di−1,i and Ci+1,i in t = τ, he assigns
probability 1
c−1 to the event that any of the other agents in the network started to deviate.
Then, the bigger the network becomes, the more likely it is a priori that the agent that
started the contagious process is an agent other than i + 1 and i + 2. Since in this case,
i +1 will not play Di+1,i until t = τ + 2, and since the net gain from cooperating with i +1
is positive for i, for a big size of the network, it is not a best response to play Di,i+1 in
t = τ + 1. However, for agent i, with probability 1
c−1 agent i + 1 started. Because of that,
if the loss from playing Ci,i+1 if i + 1 plays Di,i+1, li,i+1 is high enough, the expected payoﬀ
from carrying out the punishment may be higher than the one from going on cooperating
18for one more period. Furthermore, for agent i, with probability 1
c−1 agent i + 1 started. In
that case, agent i expects Di+1,i from t = τ + 2 on. Then, if the payoﬀ from playing Di,i+1
in t = τ +1, i.e. wi,i+1,i sv e r yh i g hi nc o m p a r i s o nt ot h ep a y o ﬀ from playing Ci,i+1, agent i
might also prefer to punish immediately.
The intuition for part 2 (c) is the following: Strategic stability rules out the belief that
agent i + 1 started and then sticks to the multilateral punishment since this is strictly
dominated by having played Di+1,i in t = τ. This only leaves a high wi,i+1 as a reason to




Figure 7: Circular network with a mutual relation
Proposition 3 resembles an everyday intuition: An agent, who beneﬁts from everybody,
hurts cooperation because he might be unwilling to punish. But we can say even more if
we restrict our attention to equilibria fulﬁlling the strategic stability criteria put forward by
Kohlberg and Mertens.
This brings us to a discussion about stability and self-enforcement of the equilibria de-
scribed so far in this section.
3.2.3 Circular networks with forgiving punishments
Network information transmission Note that (S2) does not make use of the possibility
to transmit information on observed behavior and on transmitted information oﬀered by
(I3). Due to that, the results in both informational regimes do not diﬀer. Note also again,
that not to transmit information is an equilibrium choice of an agent if, as in (S2), the
punishment phase lasts forever and thus a deviation from a would-be prescribed transmission
of information is not costly for an agent. One result of that is a complete breakdown of
the network during the punishment phase. That holds also if one considers a change in
(S2) such that the reversion to the stage Nash equilibrium does not last forever but only
for T periods. Agents will chose to infect instead of sending information and keeping up
19cooperation. Another result is that even if information could be transmitted with a high
speed and therefore induce an earlier punishment, relaxing the incentive constraint of the
agents in the network, this potential is left unused.
There are two diﬀerent avenues to follow if a punishment phase should not comprise of
a complete breakdown of the network. One is to close the network without the agent that
deviated. A second one is to reward an agent for transmitting information instead of infecting
her neighbor and to punish harshly if infection occurs. That second avenue makes use of
transmitting information and, thereby, relaxes the agents’ incentive constraint, allowing a
sustainable network for a lower δ than (S2).
For that end, let us deﬁne the following strategy proﬁle:
Strategy proﬁle S3
1. Agents start by playing Cij ∀i ∈ N S,∀j ∈ Ni.
2. As long as any agent i observes Cji ∀j ∈ Ni, and as long as no message containing
Dmn for any m ∈ N S, agent i goes on playing Cij ∀j ∈ Ni.
3. If agent i observes Dji for any j ∈ Ni and she received no message about an earlier
defection of j, agent i then sends a message about the deviation to her other neighbor
and plays Dij until j and i played Dij,Cji for T periods. After that i sends her other
neighbor a message about the end of the punishment phase for player j and they go
back to 2. thereafter. Each agent truthfully passes on the messages.
4. If a neighbor k of j receives a message about j’s initial deviation, she plays Dkj until
both, she receives the message that Dij,Cji has been played for T periods and Dkj,Cjk
has been played for T periods. She returns to 2. thereafter.
5. If agent j played Dji, she plays Cji for the next T periods, Djk in the period when k
receives the information on her initial deviation and Cjk for the next T periods. She
returns to 2. thereafter.
6. If some agent deviates from the actions in 3. — 6., the punishment starts against this
agent.
For notational convenience the following deﬁnition will be useful.































This function maps the order of the cycle c and the speed of information transmission v
into the strictly positive natural numbers and indicates the period in which an information
about play between agents i and i + 1 in period 0 reaches agent i − 1.
Proposition 4 In a non-mutual circular network of size c with gi,i+1 ≤ 0 and gi,i−1 ≥ 0





.L e te ∆ be the set of δ for which — together with
an appropriate T — (S3) constitutes a sustainable non-mutual network with gi,i+1 ≤ 0 and




.T h e n
(i) e δ ≤ δ with a strict inequality for high speeds of information transmission, i.e. for
v>1.
(ii) the network is still sustainable and strategically stable ∀δ ∈ e ∆ for any l if one substitutes
non-mutual subnetworks for mutual ones.
For the proof, which we relegate to appendix , there are four incentive constraints to
consider:
1. Every agent has to have an incentive to stick to Cij ∀j ∈ Ni as long as neither he
observes Dji for a j ∈ Ni nor he receives a message containing Dmn for an m ∈ N S.
¡
ICCI¢
2. Given one neighbor m of i played Dm,i, each agent j has to have an incentive to send
a message containing Dm,i her other neighbor n and stick to Ci,n.
¡
ICCII¢




4. Every original cheater has to agree to be punished.
¡
ICLP¢













then show that, for a speed of v = 1, by choosing an appropriate lenght T of the punishment,
the conditions for cooperation can be made equivalent to the ones for (S2). Increasing the




21in turn gives room to make punishment more severe. This establishes (i). Since agents are
being rewarded for punishing their neighbor, they always have an incentive to do so during
a punishment phase even if they want to cooperate bilaterally, which establishes (ii).
It is worth pointing out that again a pooling of asymmetries across agents will under
some parameter constellations lead to a sustainable network and, thus, to cooperation where
it would be impossible with bilateral implicit contracts.
Proposition 4 also shows that it is not necessary to have a complete breakdown of co-
operation in the network in case of a deviation if information about past actions can be
transmitted. The equilibrium is, thus, also more robust against mistakes of players and
increases welfare during punishment periods.
Perfect information transmission Since under the perfect information transmission
regime (I1) the initial cheater is known, the complete breakdown of the network in a pun-
ishment phase can be avoided by similar punishments as in (S3): All neighbors j ∈ Ni of
an initial cheater i start playing Dj,i until i has played Ci,j∀j ∈ Ni for T periods and then
they go back to plaing Ci,j,Cj,i. In all other games in the network, the players go on playing
the cooperative action during the punishment phase for player i. As the initial cheater can
always get his minimax payoﬀ forever, which is the payoﬀ from the punishment in (S1), the
biggest T, for which this strategy proﬁle is an equilibrium, gives him exactly this payoﬀ.
Therefore, these strategies result in the same set of equilibria as (S1).
No information transmission While strategy proﬁle (S3) avoids the breakdown of the
network due to mutual subnetworks for (I3), it can not be used for (I2) since it makes use
of the transmission of information. Without the transmission of information, it is impossible
to know, who deviated from the equilibrium path ﬁrst. Without this, a targeted punishment
of only the original deviator becomes impossible.
4 Circular networks with exclusion and re-closure
In the strategy proﬁles used so far, the members of possible networks and therefore the size
of such networks were ﬁxed. Strategies (S1)a n d( S2) result in the complete breakdown
of the network in case of a single deviation. (S3) on the other hand, features a hard,
shorter punishment period where only the initial deviator and his neighbors are required to
stop cooperating with each other during the punishment phase in their games. All original
members of the network, including the cheater, formed a network again after the punishment
22phase. The results obtained, thus, apply both, to situations without an exogenous geography
and to situations where there is an exogenously given natural neighborship relation for each
member of the network, i.e. a geography.
In this section, we consider a commonly used punishment both, in reality and in the net-
works literature: The permanent exclusion of a network member from the network together
with the assumption that the remaining members close the gap in the network. By deﬁ-
nition, the results in this section will therefore not apply to situations with an exogenously
given geography. This is the case because punishments involve a change in the shape of the
network.
Strategies will involve a recursive element because defections are deterred by the creation
of a new network. If this new network is not sustainable, there is no deterrence. Therefore,
also a deviation from this new network - if the same punishment is applied - has to be
deterred by the existence of a sustainable network.
As before, we also examine exclusion for the three information transmission regimes.
Throughout the section we assume unilateral networks. We will ﬁrst deﬁne exclusion, we
will then show that pure exclusion equilibria do not exist in this environment, and ﬁnally
we show that almost pure exclusion equilibria do not sustain networks with lower discount
factors than the mechanisms examined before.
Deﬁnition 8 (Punishment by exclusion) We deﬁne punishment by exclusion as the perma-
nent choice of a cheater’s neighbors to play the non-cooperative action w.r.t. the cheater
and the permanent choice of the neighbors to play the cooperative action w.r.t. each other.
Pure exclusion strategies deter deviations in every subgame with exclusion. Almost pure
exclusion strategies deter deviations in every subgame except those with networks of size 3
with exclusion.
There is one obvious drawback of these strategies: In order to be able to link to the
neighbor of the neighbor who cheated on a player, this player has to know who is the
neighbor of that cheater. This requires information on the history of his neighbor’s play,
which he does not have under (I2). We can therefore exclude the no information case from
our analyis in this subsection.
Lemma 2 Under (I2), no network is sustainable using exclusion.
With (S4), we formalize pure exclusion strategies.
23Strategy proﬁle (S4)
1.P l a y e r sk ∈ N S start by playing Ckj ∀k ∈ N S,∀j ∈ Nk.
2. Each player k goes on playing Ckj ∀j ∈ Nk as long as no deviation by any player in
the network is observed.
3. If an agent i played Di,j,
(a) her neighbors j ∈ Ni = {i + 1,i− 1} will play Dj,i forever and form a link i−1,i+1
and
(b) all k ∈ N S
−i ≡ N S − {i,i − 1;i,i + 1} + {i − 1,i+ 1} go to point 1.
Lemma 3 No non-mutual, circular network can be sustained by the pure exclusion strategies
(S4).
Proof. We give the proof for the full information case (I1). Consider ﬁgure 5 on page
13 and strategies (S4). For (S4) to be an equilibrium, we need the following conditions to
hold:




ii. For i + 1,t h el i n kw i t hi − 1 has to be non-deﬁcient as gi+1,i+2 < 0.







iv. Points (i) through (iii) must hold for any member of any network N S
−i and any member
of any reduced network thereof.
The consequence of equilibrium condition iv. is that the smallest reduced network think-
able, i.e. each bilateral relation in the original network must be sustainable. To see the
implication of condition ii. together with condition iv., remember that the deviation of any
member of the network has to be deterred. Also remember that the deviation of any member
of the resulting shrinked network has to be deterred. This requires not only gi+1,i−1 > 0,
24but also gi+2,i−1 > 0, gi+3,i−1 > 0, and so on. Consider the following ﬁgure. It represents
the consequences of using pure exclusion for the deterrance of a deviation of ﬁrst agent 1,
then agent 2, and then agent 3. For the original network to be sustainable, the second one
has to be sustainable. For its sustainability, the third one has to be sustainable, and so on.
Once arrived at the triangular network, the deviation of e.g. 6 has to be deterred — and thus
taking the punishment literally — the relation between 4 and 5 has to be mutual, which is a
violation of the assumption of a non-mutual network. The same has to hold for any other


















Let us formalize strategies using almost pure exclusion. Lemma 3 implies that a strategy
that involves exclusion as deﬁned above has to include at some point in time other pun-
ishments as well. One way of doing that is to make the punishment dependent on the size
of the remaining network, that is to focus on almost pure exclusion. Strategies (S40)m a k e




1.P l a y e r sk ∈ N S start by playing Ckj ∀k ∈ N S,∀j ∈ Nk.
2. Each player k goes on playing Ckj ∀j ∈ Nk as long as no deviation by any player in
the network is observed.
3. If an agent i played Di,j,






≥ 3, N S
−i ≡ N S − {i,i − 1;i,i + 1} + {i − 1,i+ 1},h e rn e i g h b o r s
j ∈ {i + 1,i− 1} will form a link i−1,i+1 and all agents k ∈ N S






< 3, every agent k reverts to Dkj ∀j ∈ Nk forever.
25Proposition 5 Let b δ ≡ {δ|gi,i−1 + gi,i+1 =0 }.L e tb b δ be the minimum discount factor nec-
essary to sustain a network with (S4
0)under (I1).T h e n
1. b b δ ≤ b δ.
2. the network is not strategically stable.
Proof. Part 1.: (S1) punishes a deviation immediately with the strongest possible
punishment, i.e. the one that gives the cheater his minimax payoﬀ forever. It is, therefore,
not possible to decrease the delay until punishment takes place and the strengh of the
punishment.
Part 2.: We ﬁrst give the equilibrium conditions. These are the same as for (S4), with a
slight change in iv.











iii. Points i. and ii. must hold for any member of any network N S
−i and any member of
any reduced network thereof except the triangular networks. In the triangular one,
only i. has to hold.
It is condition ii. together with iii. that drives part 2. To see the implication of condition
ii., remember that the deviation of any member of the network has to be deterred. Also
remember that the deviation of any member of the resulting shrinked network has to be
deterred. This requires not only gi+1,i−1 > 0, but also gi+2,i−1 > 0, gi+3,i−1 > 0, and so on.
Consider the following ﬁgures. The ﬁrst row represents the consequences of the deterrance


















The second row represents the consequences of a deterrance of a deviation of agent 4.















However, if all these potential relations have to be mutual, this has consequences for the
strategic stability of the equilibrium as shown in proposition 3. Q.E.D.
With (S4
0), as with restitution punishments, agents enjoy the advantage of avoiding
the breakdown of the network during a punishment phase. Thus, there is a utility gain
compared with (S1). Note that for (I1), there is no increase in stability thanks to the
shrinked network after a deviation. However, compared to restitution punishments (similar
to (S3)), the neighbors of a cheater lose utility - a payback of the damages is not done.
Furthermore, if the network fulﬁlls any other function, such that the size of the network
27matters for overall welfare, there is a loss in welfare compared to restitution punishments
due to the exclusion of the cheater.
Let us think about network information transmission (I3) .I nL e m m a2 ,w eh a v es t a t e d
that lack of knowledge about the players in the network prevents players under (I2)f r o m
closing the network in a punishment phase and therefore from using any form of exclusion
deﬁn e di nD e ﬁnition 8. This knowledge could be created under (I3) if strategies prescribe
to pass on info on your play in cooperation periods. A modiﬁcation of the strategy proﬁle
(S4) accounts for this.
Strategy proﬁle (S4
00)
1.P l a y e r sk ∈ N S start by playing Ckj ∀k ∈ N S,∀j ∈ Nk and transmitting information
on his play and received messages to each neighbor j ∈ Nk.
2. Each player k goes on playing Ckj ∀j ∈ Nk as long as he observes Cjk ∀j ∈ Nk,a n d
as long as he does not observe Cik,i / ∈ Nk.






(a) her neighbor k will
i. play Dk,j forever,
ii. play Ck,i w.r.t. j’s other neighbor i ∈ Nj
(b) If an agent i/ ∈ Nk observes Ck,i he will
i. play Di,j with agent j ∈ Nk,j∈ Ni forever.
ii. play Ci,k starting from the next period
(c) all agents k ∈ N S
−j go to point 1.






then he reverts to Dkj ∀j ∈ Nk forever.
Note again that a closure of the network — after excluding a defector — by agents formerly
not connected requires that there is no underlying geography for the network, i.e. that agents
are able to do so. Furthermore, there will be additional conditions to fulﬁll for these strategies
to be an equilibrium.
Proposition 6 Assume information structure (I3).
281.L e te ∆ be the set of δ for which — together with an appropriate T — (S3) constitutes





.L e te e ∆ be the set of δ for which (S4
00) constitutes a sustainable non-mutual




.T h e ni fli,i−2 is
not too small, if ν is not too high, and if all potential relations between members of the
network, which are not links in the network, are mutual, e e δ < e δ.
2. Sustainable networks resulting from (S4
00) are not strategically stable.
Proof. Before showing the two parts of the proposition, we give the conditions for
sustainability of the network. As before, we assume optimal deviations given the punishment.




ii. An agent i who has been cheated on by an agent i−1 has to have an incentive to play
Ci,i+1 and Ci,i−2:
g








iv. Any agent i − 2w h oo b s e r v e sCi,i−2 from a member of the network who is not his




v. Points i. through iv. must hold for any member of N S and of any network N S
−i and
any member of any reduced network thereof except the triangular networks. In the
triangular ones, only i. has to hold.
Part 1.: In this equilibrium, permanent Nash reversion of i + 1 arrives immediately.
Permanent Nash reversion of i − 1 arrives after one period. With strategy proﬁle (S3),
a punishment of i + 1 as strong as permanent Nash reversion arrives immediately. The
29punishment of i + 1 as strong as permanent Nash reversion arrives after θ(c,ν)p e r i o d s .
Since θ(c,ν)i sd e c r e a s i n gi nν, for low ν condition i. is less strict than the equivalent
condition for (S3).
Conditions iii. through v. imply, similarily to conditions ii. and iii. from (S4
0), that
all potential relations between members of the network, which are not links in the network,
have to be mutual.
Condition ii. is only less stringent than condition i. if li,i−2 is not too low.
Part 2.: As conditions iii. through v. imply that all potential relations between members
of the network, which are not links in the network, have to be mutual,i ti sp o s s i b l et od e v i a t e
suboptimally in a network N S
−i which makes a punishment of an agent in that mutual relation
by the other agent in that mutual relation a dominated action. Q.E.D.
Part 1 of proposition 6 says that under certain conditions more networks are possible
than with the forgiving, hard punishments from strategy proﬁle (S3). However, these certain
conditions are quite restrictive: all potential relations between members of the network,
which are not links in the network, have to be mutual, the loss from playing C if your
partner plays D has to be not too low, and the speed of information transmission has to
be not too high. The ﬁrst of the restrictions causes, in addition, the network to be not
strategically stable, and thus (S4
00) unlikely to be chosen as equilibrium strategies.
5 Sustainable networks of higher degree
In this section we show that the results we obtained for the simple networks above generalize
for networks in which agents have more than two neighbors. For this end, we will use a c-
cycle as a basic structure and add a link such that there now exist two subnetworks that
share the added relation.
The underlying structure of the stage game is a prisoners’ dilemma and maintaining
a relation as such is not costly. This means that the utility agents receive from having
a relation, as compared to not having it, is always bigger. If it was not for the incentive
problem, agents would always choose to cooperate in all their interactions. Adding a relation
to the network beneﬁts the agents who add this relation. Therefore, if we allow for a higher
degree of agents, they will have an incentive to add relations, including even bilaterally
deﬁcient ones, as long as this results in a sustainable network, given a basis structure.
Furthermore, the lower the discount factor of agents in a network, the more diﬃcult is it















Figure 8: Adding a relation to a circular, non-mutual network
cannot ”travels” via contagion. In these networks it disciplines to have cycles of smaller
order and thereby shorten ways.
In the remainder of the section, we consider for each of the three informational regimes,
(I1)−(I3), adding to a non-mutual circular network a bilaterally deﬁcient, a unilateral, and
a mutual relation, one at a time.
Full information (I1) Let us consider the full information (I1) paradigm. In this case,
every agent immediately knows about a deviation. With strategy proﬁle (S1), a deviating
agent will face immediate Nash reversion from all neighbors and rationally deviate only if it
pays to deviate from all relations. It is therefore straightforward to generalize proposition 1
part 1 in the following proposition stated without proof.





ij > 0 ∀i ∈ N
S. (1)
As long as (1) holds, even bilaterally deﬁcient relations can be and will maintained in
equilibrium. However, while this is an equilibrium, the same forward induction caveat that
applied to proposition 1,p a r t1 also applies here.
Consider ﬁrst ﬁgure 8, networks (b)o r( c). Since ik is a deﬁcient relation for i, N S is
only sustainable with (S1), if N S \ ik is sustainable in autarky. If this is the case, then the
equilibrium N S is not forward induction-proof in the sense of Lippert (2003). If e.g., agent
i deviates only from her relation with agent k, but not from his other two relations, then
this deviation, together with sticking to the multilateral punishment mechanism, is strictly
dominated by a simultaneous deviation from all relations and sticking to the multilateral
punishment. Furthermore there is an equilibrium — N S \ ik —w h i c h( i) Pareto-dominates
31the continuation equilibrium in the punishment phase of (S1)a n dw h i c hi s( ii)af o c a lp o i n t
after this deviation. This is a proﬁtable deviation, given the agents indeed coordinate on
N S \ ik, since gik < 0.
Consider network (a) with strategy proﬁle (S1), on the other hand. This network is
forward induction proof with (S1)i fb o t h ,N S and N S \ ik are sustainable in autarky.
There are six equilibrium networks: The empty network, ik, N S \ ik, N S \{ i,i + 1,...,k},
N S \{k,k + 1,...,i},a n dN S. The empty network is the continuation equilibrium of (S1)i f
a deviation occured. Equilibria that Pareto-dominate the empty network other than N S are
ik, N S \ik, N S\{i,i + 1,...,k},a n dN S \{k,k + 1,...,i}. The network N S \ik is focal after
a deviation that does not involve i,i+ 1 and i,i − 1.D e v i a t i n gf r o mik,e v e ni fa g e n t st h e n
play the focal equilibrium N S\ik,i sn o tp r o ﬁtable since ik is a mutual relation. The network
N S\{k,k + 1,...,i} is focal after i deviated from her relation with i+1. If this were the ﬁnal
outcome, the deviation would be proﬁtable since gi,i+1 < 0. However, N S \{k,k + 1,...,i} is
not forward induction proof: (S1) requires to play the empty network if a deviation occurs.
The network ik Pareto-dominates the empty network, and it is focal after a deviation of k
from her relation with k + 1.G i v e nt h a t ,i fi nN S agents that observe agent i deviate only
from his relation with i + 1,t h en e t w o r kN S \{ k,k + 1,...,i} will not appear, since agents
other than k will anticipate k’s deviation, and the network ik will emerge immediately after
i’s initial deviation. Since we assumed N S\ik to be sustainable with (S1), gi,i+1+gi,i−1 > 0,
the deviation is not proﬁtable and network (a) is forward induction-proof.
No information transmission (I2) Again refer to ﬁgure 8. Consider network (a). Ob-
viously, if both subnetworks ik and N S \ ik were sustainable in autarky, by treating the
subnetworks separately, adding ik to N S \ik, will of course result in a sustainable network.
However, N S \ ik does not have to be sustainable on its own: If gi,i+1 + δ
c−2gi,.i−1 < 0a n d
gi,i+1+δ
m−2gi,k+δ
c−2gi,.i−1 > 0, where m is the size of the subnetwork {i,i + 1,...,k}, adding
ik will make the network sustainable if both, i and k have, given their beliefs, an incentive
to contribute to a multilateral punishment using their mutual relation.
Proposition 8 Let a network N S consist of a non-mutual circular network of size c, N S\ik,
with gi,i+1 ≤ 0 and gi,i−1 ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N S\ik and a mutual relation ik between two non-adjacent





∀i ∈ N S \ ik.L e tb ∆ be the set of δ for which,





Then for li,k and lk,i small enough, b δ < δ.
32Proof. Assume (S2) and the beliefs speciﬁed in appendix A.3. Similar to the proof of
proposition 3, by assuming li,k and lk,i low enough, i’s (k’s) expected proﬁtf r o mp l a y i n gCik
(Cki) after having observed agent i − 1 (k − 1) deviate is smaller than if they not only play
Di,i+1 (Dk,k+1), i.e. infect agent i+1 (agent k+1), but also Di,k (Dk,i), i.e. infect also agent
k (agent i). Therefore punishment sets in earlier and a lower discount factor is needed to
sustain N S. Q.E.D.
Again, if i’s (k’s) loss from playing Cik (Cki)i fk (i)p l a y sDki (Dik)i sh i g h ,t h ee x p e c t e d
payoﬀ from not punishing is very low and the agents sharing the mutual relation are willing
to contribute to a collective punishment mechanism.
Consider networks (b)a n d( c). Here, adding the relation ik, which is unilateral (bilaterally
deﬁcient), involves a trade-oﬀ. On the one hand, punishment will be faster, which relaxes
the incentive constraint for each agent in the network and makes the network sustainable for
lower discount factors. On the other hand, one agent (two agents) will have to sustain one
deﬁcient relation more, which tightens the incentive constraint for this agent (these agents).
It is, thus, not clear whether the set of discount factors for which the network is sustainable
increases or shrinks with adding the additional relation.
The conditions for sustainability of the network, which we give together with the belief
structure in appendix A.3, are a straightforward generalization of the conditions we had for
the simple network with deg(i) ≤ 2.
Network information transmission (I3) Again, consider network (a) and strategies
(S3). Since (S3) involves transmission of hard evidence, agents only have information sets
that are singletons, and thus, beliefs are not necessary to specify. For network (a)t ob e
sustainable, the incentive constraints for agents other than i and k, are equivalent to the
ones given in appendix A.2 with one change: Since the ways are shorter, θ(c,ν)w i l lb e
substituted by θ(m,ν) for agents j ∈ {i + 1,...,k − 1} and by θ(c − m +2 ,ν) for agents
j ∈ {k + 1,...,i − 1}. As an example for the incentive constraints for agents i and k,w eg i v e
the ones for i in appendix A.4. As we see, the sustainability conditions from appendix A.2
generalize.
Consider networks (b)a n d( c). As under (I2), adding the relation ik, which is unilateral
(bilaterally deﬁcient), involves a trade-oﬀ. On the one hand, punishment will be faster,
which relaxes the incentive constraint for each agent in the network and makes the network
sustainable for lower discount factors. This is true for networks large enough or information
transmission slow enough — such that there is a diﬀerence to full information. On the other
33hand again, one agent (two agents) will have to sustain one deﬁcient relation more, which
tightens the incentive constraint for this agent (these agents). It is, thus, not clear whether
the set of discount factors for which the network is sustainable increases or shrinks with
adding the additional relation.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In our model, agents maintain relations by using a network that, in addition to their own
relations, consists of other agents’ relations. We identify equilibrium conditions for diﬀerent
architectures of such networks, paying special attention to diﬀerences in these conditions
for circular and non-circular architectures. The basic framework is that of repeated games
between ﬁxed partners with three basic information structures: complete information, no
information, and information transmission through the network’s links. We distinguish equi-
libria which make use of the creation of new links in the punishment period from those that
do not.
We show that if agents cannot discipline themselves within a certain relation, pooling
asymmetries in payoﬀs can sustain the relation under these three informational assumptions.
In contrast to previous literature, the possibility to transmit information about the cheating
of someone through the links in the network has not been an equilibrium action if enforcement
relied on unforgiving punishment. With unforgiving punishment, the deviation of an agent
starts a contagious process that eliminats cooperation in the network. We showed that with
more complex punishment strategies, agents use information transmission, and thereby keep
on cooperating in the rest of the network while punishing the deviator — which increases
eﬃciency and decreases the discount factor necessary to sustain the network. We show that,
under the complete information assumption, bilaterally unsustainable relations in a non-
circular network, can be supported by having self-sustaining relations at the ends of the
network while this does not work for the other informational assumptions. We also showed
that having self-sustaining relations in the network may actually hurt cooperation in the case
without full information because agents might not be willing to perform the punishment if
a suboptimal deviation occured. In this case a network may be sustainable if agents use less
severe punishments than grim trigger or by rewarding the punisher. The results were ﬁnally
generalized to more complex network architectures.
Possible applications of our model or of modiﬁcations thereof, include the organization of
inter-ﬁrm relations in industrial districts, social capital or collusive behavior that is enforced
34in networks of very diﬀerent players. In her much acclaimed book, Saxenian (1994) attributes
a large part of Silicon Valley’s success to a special culture of cooperation in that industrial
district, which stems from a common background of the early workforce in that area. Our
model may help explain what Saxanian calls a “culture of cooperation” with the means
of economics and game theory as a network of long-term relations, each of which perhaps
might not be sustainable on a bilateral basis. The main contrast of our model to Saxenian’s
discussion is that we do not use a “culture” but an implicit multilateral threat of retaliation
to keep the members of the network cooperating so closely.
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A Proofs and beliefs
A.1 Proposition 3
First we proof that with an unforgiving punishment, cooperation may break down if we
replace a unilateral relation with a mutual one. We then show that for Ui (Cij,D ji)i nt h e
mutual relation small enough, the set of equilibria will not shrink.
Proof. Part 2 (a) and (b). Consider strategies (S2) and beliefs as outlined above.
Suppose, we are in the situation of ﬁgure 7 with agents i and i + 1 forming a mutual
subnetwork. Consider the following defection: Agent i + 1 plays Di+1,i+2 and after c − 2
periods goes on playing Ci+1,i.A f t e r c − 2p e r i o d s ,s a yi np e r i o dt = τ,a g e n ti observes
Di−1,i and Ci+1,i.P l a y i n gDi,i+1 in t = τ +1 is rational for agent i only if she expects i+1 to
play Di+1,i in t = τ +1. Whether she expects this to happen, depends on her beliefs on who
started the deviation. Agent i may have three possible beliefs about who defected initially.
(a) Agent i +1 started and deviated only from his relation with i +2. I fag en ti+ 1 after
his initial deviation sticks to the strategies prescribed, he will play Di+1,i in t = τ +1.
Then it is in i’s best interest to play Di,i+1 as well. In the expected dicounted payoﬀ,
this receives a bigger weight, the lower li,i+1.
(b) Agent i +2s t a r t e d : T h e ni +2w o u l di n f e c ti + 1 in t = τ + 1, thus, no matter what
agent i plays in t = τ +1,a g e n ti+1 will play Di+1,i in t = τ +2. Therefore it is better
to have a deviation proﬁti nt = τ + 1 and play Di,i+1. In the expected dicounted
payoﬀ, this receives a bigger weight, the higher wi,i+1.
(c) An agent m ∈ N S \{ i,i + 1,i+2 } started: The earliest period when i + 1 would be
infected by i +2w o u l db eτ +2 . T h u si will expect i + 1 to play Ci+1,i at least until
t = τ +2 . S i n c ew ea s s u m e dgi,i+1 > 0, for this belief it is not a best response to play
Di,i+1 in t = τ + 1.
37Since agent i does not have any information, a consistent belief is that cases (a) and
(b) have occured with probability 1
c−1 and case (c) with probability c−3
c−1.I f c gets large,
therefore, the expected payoﬀ for agent i from deferring the punishment phase by one period
may become positive.
This in turn delays the expected punishment date of an initial deviator, which leads to
a breakdown of the network if li,i+1 is not small and wi,i+1 is not big.
Part 2 (c). The proof parallels the one for proposition 2 part 3. Q.E.D.
A.2 Proposition 4
In the proof we ﬁrst consider the incentive constraints for agents in the network not to
deviate from cooperation in phase I (ICCI), from cooperation with their other neighbor in
phase II that is if one neighbor cheated (ICCII), from punishing the original cheater in phase
II (ICP), and from letting the others punish when she deviated in the ﬁrst place (ICLP). In
as e c o n ds t e pw es h o wt h a te δ ≤ δ.I ti ss h o w nt h a tICCII and ICP are never binding, so we
can concentrate on ICCI and ICLP. For a speed of v = 1, by an appropriate choice of the
lenght of the punishment, the conditions for cooperation can be made equivalent to the ones
for (S2). Increasing the speed then relaxes ICLP which gives room to make punishment
more severe, which establishes (i): e δ ≤ δ. Since agents are being rewarded for punishing
their neighbor, they always have an incentive to do so during a punishment phase even if
they want to cooperate bilaterally, which establishes (ii).
Proof. The following incentive constraints are to be satisﬁed:
1.( ICCI) For each agent i,p l a y i n gDi,i+1 in t =0a n dDi,i−1 in t = θ(c,v), which
is her best deviation, yields wi,i+1 in t =0 ,li,i+1 for the following T periods and
ci,i+1 thereafter, as well as ci,i−1 until t = θ(c,v) − 1,w i,i−1 in t = θ(c,v),l i,i−1 for
the following T periods and ci,i−1 thereafter. Playing Ci,i+1 and Ci,i−1 forever yields
1
1−δ (ci,i+1 + ci,i−1). Summing up leads to
¡
ICCI¢
, which is the condition for (S3)t o






























S,i + 1,i− 1 ∈ Ni.
382. (ICCII) Suppose we are in phase II and in period t = 0, agent i − 1 played Di−1,i.
(a) Furthermore suppose θ(c,v) ≥ T − 1. Then nothing changes in his interactions
with i + 1 from the case where θ(c,v) <T− 1. However in his interactions with
i − 1, I will already have returned to phase I, which means he will give up ci,i−1
for T periods by infecting i + 1.T h u s ,i is in the same situation as if he never
had been cheated on by i − 1,w h i c hm e a n sICCII = ICCI.
IC
CII = IC
CI if θ(c,v) ≥ T − 1,
(b) Suppose now θ(c,v) <T− 1.A f t e ro b s e r v i n gDi−1,i in t = 0, a deviation, that
is playing Di,i+1, yields the same payoﬀs from the interactions with i + 1 as in
phase I. Thus the ﬁrst line of ICCII coincides with the ﬁrst line in ICCI.I f i n
t = 1,a g e n ti plays Di,i+1 istead of sticking to cooperation and just sending a
message, this results in agent i + 1 sending a message that reaches agent i − 1 in
t = θ(c,v)+1. This yields agent i a utility of li,i−1 until t = θ(c,v)+T +2 . By
sticking to cooperation, she would have had a utility of wi,i−1 from t = θ(c,v)+1
until t = T and of ci,i−1 from t = T + 1.T h i sd i ﬀerence constitutes the second








































t (ci,i−1 − wi,i−1) < 0
0
∀θ(c,v) <T− 1
∀θ(c,v) ≥ T − 1 ,
whenever ICCI holds, ICCII is satisﬁed.
3. (ICP) Suppose agent i receives the message that agent i+1 deviated in their relation
with one of their other neighbors. Then agent i has to have an incentive to punish
him. Since wi,j >c i,j together with
¡
ICCI¢
,t h i si sa l w a y st h ec a s e .
394. (ICLP) Suppose we are in phase II and in period t = 0, agent i − 1 played Di−1,i.
An agent i − 1 who has cheated on i has to agree to the punishment, i.e. agree to
playing (Ci−1,i,D i,i−1)f o rT periods instead of his minimax strategy forever. After
having played Di−1,i in t =0 , for agent i − 1 sticking to punishment strategies means
incurring li−1,i for T periods and ci−1,i thereafter. It furthermore means wi−1,i−2 in
t = θ(c,v),l i−1,i−2 for the following T periods and ci−1,i−2 thereafter. Deviating from
punishment strategies yields di−1,i forever,w i−1,i−2 in t = θ(c,v)a n ddi−1,i−2 forever
thereafter. The diﬀerence between these utilities (transformed to the situation where















































is strictly increasing in δ for δ ∈ (0,1). Both conditions do not
hold for a δ close to 0. They do hold strictly for a δ close enough to 1, thus there exists a
e δ for which both constraints hold. Therefore under the conditions stated, strategy (S3)i s
subgame perfect for δ > e δ.
Since li,j <d i,j,i ti sp o s s i b l et oﬁxaT such that ICLP =0 4.G i v e nt h a tT, ﬁx v = 1,
such that θ(c,v)=c−2. For this, ICCI is satisﬁed for all δ that satisfy δ
c−2gi,i−1+gi,i+1 ≥ 0.
Now consider v>1. Again, it is possible to ﬁxaT such that ICLP = 0. That ensures the
same strentgh of the punishment. But now the punishment in the non-deﬁcient relation sets
in earlier which reduces the value of the deviation and therefore for v>1, e δ < δ. Q.E.D.
4That means that the punishment is as strong as if the deviator was punished with inﬁnite reversion to
the static Nash equilibium.
















For networks (a), (b), and (c), we assume the following beliefs:
For agents j/ ∈ {i,k}, beliefs are such that
(i) if they observe cooperation on both sides, they believe that all agents in the network
cooperated so far,
(ii) if they observe a deviation on both sides, they believe that the neighbor with whom
they share their deﬁcient relation was the ﬁrst to deviate, and
(iii) if they observe a deviation only from the agent with whom they share their non-deﬁcient
relation, they give an equal probability to the event that any of the other players was
the ﬁrst to deviate.
For agents i and k, beliefs are such that
(iv) if they observe cooperation from all neighbors, they believe that all agents in the network
cooperated so far,
(v) if they observe a deviation by all neighbors, they believe that everybody in the network
deviated,
(vi)i fi (if k)o b s e r v e sa g e n ti − 1 (agent k − 1) deviate, but the other neighbors co-
operate, agent i (agent k) gives an equal probability to the event that any agent
j ∈ {k,k + 1,...,i − 1} (any agent j ∈ {i,i + 1,...,k − 1})w a st h eﬁrst to deviate,
(vii)i f i (if k) observes agents i−1 and k (agents k−1 and i) deviate, but the other neighbor
cooperate, he believes that agent k (agent i)w a st h eﬁrst to deviate,
41(viii)i fi (if k)o b s e r v e sa g e n tk, agent i + 1,o rb o t h ,a g e n t sk and i + 1, (agent i,a g e n t
k +1, or both, agents i and k +1) deviate, but the other neighbors cooperate, agent i
(agent k) gives an equal probability to the event that any agent j ∈ {i + 1,i+2 ,...,k}
(any agent j ∈ {k + 1,k+2 ,...,i})w a st h eﬁrst to deviate, and
(ix)i fi (if k) observes agents i−1 and i+1 (agents k −1 and k +1) deviate, but the other
neighbor cooperate, agent i (agent k) gives an equal probability to the event that any
agent j ∈ N S \ i (any agent j ∈ N S \ k)w a st h eﬁrst to deviate.
Let N S \ ik be of size c and the subnetwork {i,i + 1,...,k − 1,k,i} be of size m.T h e n
























j,j−1 ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ {k + 1,...,i − 1}







During a cooperation phase, it must be proﬁtable for i to play Ci,i+1,Ci,k,Ci,i−1
at any time, which yields ci,i+1, ci,k,a n dci,i−1 in each period, instead of choosing his
best deviation (”static“ best reply), which would be to play Di,i+1 in t =0 ,Di,k in
t = θ(m,ν), and Di,i−1 in t = θ(c,ν) and then to face a T− period punishment during

















































Suppose that agent i−1 deviated in t = −1.A g e n ti has to have an incentive to
pass on this information in t = 0 to both his neighbors, i+1 and k, instead of infecting
42his neighbors i + 1 in t =0a n dk in t = θ(m,ν) and then facing the punishment
prescribed against himself. Again, we have to distinguish two cases depending on the
speed of information transmission.
(a) If T − 1 < θ(c,ν), then the information that i did not pass on the info, but




CI ∀θ(c,v) ≥ T − 1.
(b) If T − 1 ≥ θ(c,v), then the information that i did not pass on the info, but
cheated instead against i + 1, reaches i − 1 after i and i − 1 have gone back to
cooperation. That means that i looses punishment proﬁts wi,i−1 for a number of























































t (ci,i−1 − wi,i−1) < 0
0
∀θ(c,v) ≥ T − 1







holds. Agent i also always has an incentive








3. (ICP) Suppose agent i receives the message that agent i+1 (agent k) deviated in their
relation with one of their other neighbors. Then agent i has to have an incentive to
punish them. Since wi,j >c i,j together with
¡
ICCI¢




Lastly, agent i has to have an incentive to let his neighbors carry out the
punishment on him if he deviated. He can ensure himself a payoﬀ of di,i+1, di,k,a n d
di,i−1 forever by playing Di,i+1, Di,k,a n dDi,i−1 forever. This limits the punishment




















































By choosing an appropriate Ti, the punishment can again be made as hard as in the
contagious equilibrium (with strategies (S2) and the respective beliefs). With ν > 1,
due to a faster punishment, the discount factor necessary to sustain the network will
again be lower than with (S2).
44